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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: HOMOGENEOUS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CULTURES
I feel in a couple of situations that were very, very critical, then I saw [the] difference
between how men and women behave. . . . I’ve seen situations where the women were
more willing to dig into the difficult questions and to really go to the bottom even if it
was extremely painful for the rest of the board, but mostly for the CEO . . . when it
comes to the really difficult situations, [where] you think that the CEO has . . . done
something criminal . . . [o]r you think that he has done something negligent, something
that makes it such that you . . . are unsure whether he’s the suitable person to be in the
driving seat.
– Interviewee 14
(Norwegian public company board director, woman)
[I]f . . . a new category of society shall be given power, someone will have to give away
that power. . . . And that is not an easy thing to do.
– Interviewee 3
(Norwegian public company board director, woman)
Berkshire does not have a policy regarding the consideration of diversity in identifying
nominees for director. In identifying director nominees, the . . . Committee does not
seek diversity, however defined.
– Annual proxy statements of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (2010–2013)
The lack of gender parity in corporate boardrooms, and in the governance of economic
institutions more generally, has ignited a heated global debate. In 2010, the International Monetary
Fund’s managing director Christine Lagarde (at the time, France’s finance minister) drily quipped that
the face of the global financial crisis would have had a very different complexion “if Lehman Brothers
had been ‘Lehman Sisters.’”1 While her comment was viewed favorably in some quarters,2 it elicited
scathing critique from others; some characterized it as “a kind of lazy, sugar-and-spice gender
essentialism” and “a tedious slice of benevolent sexism.”3 That same year, members of a French feminist
direct action group crashed the annual shareholder meeting of the Fortune Global 500 firm Veolia
Environnement. Sporting faux beards, they sarcastically asked the CEO whether it was “wise to allow
women to define the strategy of a company, a task requiring intelligence, an ability to react, and
coolheadedness?”4 At the time, just one of the firm’s seventeen directors was a woman.5

1

Christine Lagarde, “Women, Power and the Challenge of the Financial Crisis”, The New York Times (10 May 2010),
online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/opinion/11iht-edlagarde.html?dbk>. The governance of financial
institutions is a distinct issue that is not the focus of this book. I use this example only to illustrate the breadth of
the global conversation and as a springboard for the ensuing discussion of corporate board diversity.
2
“In Praise of … Women Bankers”, Editorial, The Guardian (9 October 2013), online:
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/09/women-bankers>.
3
Ally Fogg, “Don't Give Me This 'If Lehman Sisters Had Been In Charge …' Nonsense”, The Guardian (17 September
2013), online:
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/dont-give-me-lehman-brothers-sisters-nonsense>.
4
Tara Patel, “French Women Storm the Corporate Boardroom”, Bloomberg Businessweek (10 June 2010), online:
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_25/b4183015410606.htm>.
5
Ibid.
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Lagarde, and others who have expressed similar sentiments, have contemplated the paucity of
women in positions of decision-maker power and helped advance a dialogue over whether regulation
might facilitate equality and improve governance.6 Her comments, like the French feminists’ protests,
highlight the key issues that inform conversations currently taking place internationally with respect to
gender representation in corporate governance. Why are some groups well represented in corporate
leadership positions while others are not? Would increased heterogeneity result in different financial
outcomes or differences in how firms are managed? And should global regulators intervene with
corrective measures that attempt to diversify corporate hierarchies, or would this represent an
unjustified interference with market sovereignty? If intervention is warranted, what form should it take?
Global statistics indicate that women are noticeably underrepresented on the boards of the
world’s most significant publicly traded corporations,7 and that country-level progress generally is
“slow” and “incremental.”8 Regionally, Europe displays the most noteworthy movement toward
balanced representation levels. North America lags behind Europe (with Canada trailing the United
States), and Asia (especially Japan and China) remains virtually stagnant.9 Norway, Sweden, and Finland
exhibit the highest percentages of women in global boardrooms, at 40.9 percent, 27 percent, and 26.8
percent, respectively. In comparison, the United States sits at 16.9 percent and Canada at 12.1
percent.10 Figure 1.1 presents the percentage of board seats women hold in forty-four countries from
Europe, North America, Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Africa, as well as Australia.
These statistics have recently become the subject of regulatory attention, with states seeking to
diversify the upper echelons of their corporate sectors by pursuing law-based ameliorative strategies. In
this book, I evaluate the two primary approaches that states and regulators have adopted to date.11 The
first consists of board diversity quotas, imposed by legislators, and related target-based initiatives. In
their most potent form, these measures mandate particular levels of gender balance in the boardroom.
The second, less interventionist strategy, requires information disclosure. Rather than dictating a
predetermined outcome, regulators ask corporations to publicly report on diversity-related governance
practices in varying levels of detail.
In global policy dialogues, commentators and policymakers invoke different justifications in
support of these diversification efforts. They frequently present economic rationales, the argument
being that diversified boards may enhance organizational performance. Also important, though
frequently overshadowed, are equality-based arguments. These justifications, in turn, engage some of
6

Lagarde herself has endorsed the use of mandatory quotas in the corporate context. See Leyla Boulton & Andrew
Hill, “Lagarde Embraces Quotas at FT Conference” The Financial Times (16 November 2010), online:
<www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a219537c-f1b0-11df-bb5a-00144feab49a.html#axzz2zimxBtYC>.
7
My analysis in this book centers on for-profit corporations that issue securities for public distribution and are the
subject of securities regulation, though I also make reference to state-owned enterprises and privately held
corporations.
8
Kimberly Gladman & Michelle Lamb, “GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards Survey” (April 2013) at 1, online: GMI
Ratings <http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2013/05/gmi-ratings-2013-women-on-boards-survey/>.
9
Ibid.
10
Catalyst, “2013 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors” (10 December 2013) at 1, online:
<www.catalyst.org/system/files/2013_catalyst_census_fortune_500_women_board_directors.pdf>; Catalyst,
“2013 Catalyst Census: Financial Post 500 Women Board Directors” (3 March 2014) at 1, online:
<www.catalyst.org/system/files/2013_catalyst_census_financial_post_500_women_board_directors.pdf>.
11
As noted in chapter 3, these two approaches should not be viewed as alternatives—a number of countries
contain overlapping regulatory mechanisms.
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the most fundamental issues of corporate theory. Questions of whether and how the state should seek
to increase corporate governance diversity are strongly linked to competing conceptions of the
corporate form. Is the firm’s primary purpose to maximize the wealth of shareholders? Does it also exist
to promote the general social welfare? While I am primarily concerned with how the regulatory
mechanisms noted above operate in practice, I also examine their intersection with these underlying
justifications. Most notably, I critically engage with instrumental, market-based reasoning. I argue that
state-based intervention is essential to shifting existing norms, but should be based on a combination of
factors related to organizational governance and decision making and the goals of democratizing power
and equitably distributing access to opportunities.
[Insert Figure 1.1 here: Percentage of board seats women hold globally]

Variance in corporate governance models and the move toward diversity regulation
The purpose of the corporate board and the board’s relationship with other actors in corporate
governance systems are not singular. Legal cultures in different jurisdictions envision the board playing
varied roles. Factors such as the existing shareholder culture, particularly whether it is widely or closely
held, and the degree to which the law recognizes the role of nonshareholder stakeholders, such as
employees, creditors, and suppliers, inform the construction of these roles.12 Similarly, boards exhibit
structural variance. In the dual system, found in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and
Austria, distinct supervisory and management boards perform the respective roles of overseeing and
monitoring management and managing the firm’s day-to-day business affairs. In the more common
unitary system, exemplified by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, a single board
performs both roles.13 Various jurisdictions afford firms the option to choose between a single- or twotiered form,14 and some, including the Nordic states, self-identify as lying “between” these regimes.15
Significant academic debate abounds on whether the forces of globalization will result in a
convergence of corporate governance laws and norms toward a single model,16 and in general
“[c]orporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the world.”17 Board diversity–related reform
represents an important component of the current dialogue. In all corporate governance cultures, dual
or unitary, shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented, the reality is that states have now begun tackling the
difficult questions noted above. And in doing so, momentum is building toward the adoption of law-

12

Paul L Davies & Klaus J Hopt, “Corporate Boards in Europe – Accountability and Convergence” (2013) 61:2 Am J
Comp L 301 at 302-03.
13
Klaus J Hopt, “Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation” in Andreas
M Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt, eds, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3 at 29-31.
14
Ibid at 98.
15
See the 2009 joint paper published by the corporate governance agencies of Norway, Finland, Denmark,
Sweden, and Iceland. Danish Corporate Governance Committee et al, “Corporate Governance in the Nordic
Countries” (April 2009) at 8, online: Iceland Chamber of Commerce <www.vi.is/files/Nordic%20CG%20%20web_1472238902.pdf> (“The Nordic corporate governance structure lies between the Anglo-Saxon one-tier
and the continental European two-tier model.”).
16
The proconvergence argument is most notably, and controversially, advanced in Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 439 at 468 (arguing “the triumph” and
“ideological hegemony” of the Anglo-American shareholder-focused structure).
17
Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, “Introduction” in Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds, Convergence and
Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1 at 1.
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based or “law like” structures,18 in both common and civil law jurisdictions. While such reform has
appeared primarily in developed economies, initiatives (or proposed initiatives) in countries such as
India, Kenya, Malawi, the United Arab Emirates, and South Africa suggest that this trend has reached
developing economies as well.19
These developments underscore that the dynamics of international economic activity do not
exist in isolation, but are integral components of a broader societal landscape.20 In understanding how
corporations are situated, it is useful to call to mind the intellectual project of Hungarian economic
historian Karl Polanyi, who shows society and the market to be in a state of “related tension.”21 The
market is embedded within the society, and in order to protect against the risks that follow selfinterested gain, “market societies must construct elaborate rules and institutional structures.”22 This
dynamic constitutes Polanyi’s “double movement” thesis: as the negative effects of economic activity
emerge, protective reactions emanate from society. These reactions resist efforts to decontextualize the
economy from societal institutions.23 Block discusses these themes by invoking the image of a rubber
band. Attempts to enhance market sovereignty raise the degree of tension as the band is stretched. As
this elongation continues, the band will eventually break, resulting in social dissolution, or retract,
resulting in the market going back to an embedded state.24
This analytical structure has obvious applicability to debates on globalization, deregulation, and
the financial crisis. But it is also relevant to corporate governance diversity. According to traditional
economic theory, the market should eventually address and protect against biases related to sociodemographic status.25 However, this proposition, to date, has not proven true at the highest levels of
the corporation. Correspondingly, states have begun to impose regulatory and institutional frameworks
that constrict unbridled market movements, thereby grounding the market in the “moral fabric of
society.”26 As noted above and as I further discuss in subsequent chapters, the justifications for these
18

Davies & Hopt, supra note 12 at 327. See also Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, “Corporate Boards, Incentive
Pay and Shareholder Activism in Europe: Main Issues and Policy Perspectives” in Massimo Belcredi & Guido
Ferrarini, eds, Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1 at 28 (“[R]egulation is the single most important factor
explaining differences in board gender diversity across European countries.”).
19
Further details are provided below and in chapters 3 and 7.
20
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, “What Does it Mean to Take A Socio-Legal Approach to International Economic Law?” in
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ed, Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext
(Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2013) 3 at 9.
21
Mark Banks, “Karl Polanyi, The Rubberband Man” (12 December 2008), online: The Open University
<http://www.open2.net/blogs/society/index.php/2008/12/12/karl-polanyi-the-rubberband-man?blog=10>.
22
Fred Block, “Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation” (2003) 32:3 Theory & Soc’y 275 at 297.
23
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York: Farrar &
Rinehart, 1944) at 76 (“While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe . . . on the other hand
a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the
market. . . . Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system . . .”).
24
Fred Block, “Introduction” in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
Time, 2d ed (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2001) at xxv.
25
Richard A Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992) at 9 (“Competitive markets with free entry offer better and more certain
protection against invidious discrimination than any antidiscrimination law.”).
26
Jens Beckert, “The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology” in
Chris Hann & Keith Hart, eds, Market and Society: The Great Transformation Today (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 38 at 41.
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interventions have not been solely (or even predominantly) predicated on equality-based grounds, but
the interventions push in that direction nonetheless.
Roadmap of subsequent chapters
In this book, I focus on the corporate boardroom as a core location of power in the global
marketplace.27 I explore the boardroom as a site of contestation over socio-demographic diversity and
as a place of social closure and social struggle. I consider who has been granted access to the highest
levels of the corporate hierarchy, and, in recognizing the homogeneity of this site, I explore the
ameliorative strategies states and regulators employ in an effort to alter the status quo. What shape
have these initiatives taken and what has been their effect?
Fundamentally, this is a book about corporate governance—the “system by which companies
are directed and controlled.”28 Corporate governance has exploded as a subject of reflection in
scholarly, policy, educational, and practitioner-based circles.29 The degree of attention it attracts has
only intensified in the wake of the global financial collapse.30 As a field of intellectual inquiry, it is
remarkably vast, with a wealth of literature from a range of academic traditions addressing the host “of
legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations can do, who
controls them, [and] how that control is exercised.”31
This book is also fundamentally about a set of questions that have received much less attention
from legal scholars of the corporation: questions involving the social phenomenon of diversity. Diversity
itself is an amorphous and heavily contested concept.32 Construed expansively, it might encompass the
full array of groups and persons that compose any given community.33 Sociologists of culture, however,
identify it as a “keyword”—a linguistic expression that possesses widely acknowledged connotations but
is also “open to local interpretation” and dependent on context and “the social location of the

27

“Boardroom – the word alone conjures up visions of power, wealth, and privilege . . .” Jay W Lorsch & Elizabeth
MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press,
1989) at 1.
28
Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992)
at para 2.5.
29
Mike Wright et al, “Introduction” in Mike Wright et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013) 1 at 1.
30
Hopt, supra note 13 at 5. For a review of the schools of thought on whether corporate governance structures
and processes were a significant factor in the financial crisis, see William Sun, Jim Stewart & David Pollard,
“Introduction: Rethinking Corporate Governance – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis” in William Sun, Jim
Stewart & David Pollard, eds, Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1 at 4-7.
31
Margaret M Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995) at 3.
32
Joyce M Bell & Douglas Hartmann, “Diversity in Everyday Discourse: The Cultural Ambiguities and Consequences
of ‘Happy Talk’” (2007) 72:6 Am Soc Rev 895 at 896 (“However defined, the concept of diversity has come under
heavy scrutiny from public intellectuals.”).
33
Faisal Bhabha, “Towards a Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education,” 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ [forthcoming in 2014]
at 9.
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speaker.”34 As Schuck observes, diversity “means different things to different people” and can “mean
different things even to the same person at a single point in time.”35
Because I am concerned with the socio-demographic homogeneity of corporate boards, this
book focuses primarily on identity-based markers of diversity. In the field of corporate governance,
international regulatory efforts aimed at diversification have largely involved gender. For that reason,
much of this book necessarily considers the lack of women in the upper echelons of business
corporations and the relationship between gender and economic governance.36
Chapter 2 lays the foundation for understanding recent regulatory innovations in three ways. I
begin by considering why the international spotlight is focused on boards of directors in particular as
sites for diversification. With an emphasis on the United States and Canada, I then consider possible
explanations for existing low levels of representation. I question the narrative of a supply problem that
often originates from firms and suggest that a more appropriate explanation lies in the coupling of
implicit cognitive biases with the fact that the networks of existing directors are limited in scope and
restrict entry. I close by evaluating the rationales for diversification. How has the reform-based
discourse, to date, justified the push toward increased boardroom heterogeneity? I unpack the
difficulties of the dominant “business case” for diversity and advocate an approach that centers on
social equality, as well as on governance effectiveness and decision making, rather than on a
consequentialist view of shareholder wealth maximization.
As noted, regulators have turned to formal remedial measures in an effort to curb the ubiquity
of male-dominated corporate leadership structures. In chapters 3 through 7 I present and situate the
core original research of the book, focusing on the two primary modes of legal regulation adopted to
date. Chapter 3 introduces corporate board quotas. I provide an overview of existing quota and targetbased regimes, teasing out their key characteristics and elucidating how these systems work. I then turn
to corporate reporting. In 2009, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a diversity
disclosure rule that, among other things, asks publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider
diversity in identifying director nominees. I examine the rule’s details and explore its conceptual
underpinnings. I also address reactions to the rule and contend that, despite the controversy, the SEC
did not stray significantly from its mandate when promulgating it.
Chapter 3 concludes by contextualizing these initiatives within wider bodies of regulatory
thought. I present quotas as a form of command-and-control regulation, according to which the
relationship between the regulator and the regulated is hierarchical and predicated on a deterrencebased logic. In contrast, disclosure represents a form of decentered, new governance regulation where
the state no longer serves as the sole or primary regulator. Rather, it forms but one part of a pluralistic
regulatory environment where the regulated entity and other nonstate actors also contribute to the
formulation of an overall normative ordering. In the case of quotas, the regulation of corporate

34

Ellen Berrey, “Bottom-Line Diversity: Race and Productive Pluralism in the Post-Civil Rights Era” (September
2012) at 27, online: SUNY-Buffalo <www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~eberrey/index_files/Berrey-%20BottomLine%20Diversity-%20Intro,%20Chap%201,%20Chap%205,%20Sept%202012.pdf>.
35
Peter H Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 2003) at 19.
36
In choosing to focus this book on gender diversity at the highest levels of the firm, I acknowledge that I am
concentrating on a small, privileged group that draws advantage from class differentials.
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governance diversity takes places at the state’s behest; with disclosure, it takes place more in the state’s
shadow.37
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the quota-based approach in greater depth. Using a qualitative,
interview-based methodology, I study Norwegian corporate directors’ lived experiences with mandated
gender balance. The stories of Norwegian board members offer particularly rich sources of insight, given
that Norway was the first jurisdiction to pursue the quota path and thus has the most mature quota
regime. Because corporate law does not traditionally concern itself with matters related to identitybased representation, it is rather striking that Norway’s quota is located not in human rights or equalityrelated regulations, but rather in the heart of the legal regime that gives life and personality to
corporations—Norwegian corporate law. While highly contentious when adopted, the Norwegian quota
project unquestionably set the stage for subsequent legislative developments in countries such as
Iceland, Italy, France, and Belgium,38 each of which passed its own quota provision in 2010 or 2011.39
Fundamentally, boards of directors are social groups. As in any such group, complicated
relational dynamics inform their interactions. Boards establish behavior-centered practices that they
believe will facilitate the optimal performance of their duties. They thrive on cohesion. Their established
norms are easily entrenched and not easily displaced.40 And yet, the spread of diversity quotas has
accomplished precisely that. The forced repopulation of boards along gender lines has disturbed the
traditional order of corporate governance systems, dislocating established hierarchies of power and
privilege in key market-based institutions. Norway represents the paradigmatic case of this disturbance
and has set in motion a wave of corporate governance reform unlike any other. As such, it constitutes a
fascinating and appropriate case study through which to consider the implications of quota regimes.
Chapters 6 and 7 critically examine the United States’ experiment with diversity disclosure. I rely
on the United States as a second case study for three principal reasons. First, similar to the Norwegian
law, the site that houses the US rule is noteworthy. Once again, it is not found in regulation that focuses
on antidiscrimination, but rather in the center of the legal regime that governs the public issuance of
shares—US securities law. The US rule has thus been controversial, with some painting it as being
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of securities regulation. Second, US markets represent the
biggest share of overall global market capitalization.41 American reform efforts have thus inevitably
attracted attention and warrant scrutiny. And third, I am mindful of the argument that scholars such as
Schuck make that there is something special—something unique—about the United States’ recent

37

The shadow metaphor is recently used to great effect in Marc T Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of
the State (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2013).
38
European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, “Positive Action Measures to Ensure Full
Equality in Practice between Men and Women, including on Company Boards” (2011) at 1, online: European
Commission
<http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/positive-action-measures-to-ensure-full-equality-in-practicebetween-men-and-women-including-on-company-boardspbDS3112694/?CatalogCategoryID=cOwKABstC3oAAAEjeJEY4e5L>.
39
Catalyst, “Legislative Board Diversity” (August 2013), online: <http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-boarddiversity#footnote10_7ftls5m>.
40
Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, “The Social Nature of Boards” (2005) 70:4 Brook L Rev 1259 at 1265-70.
41
See “Top 20 Nations Listed by Stock Market Cap (In Billions)” (25 August 2013), online: Will Banks' Blog - A
Weblog of Business, Strategy, Politics, Competitive Insights and the Economy
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/willbanks/2013/08/25/top-20-nations-listed-by-company-market-cap/> (presenting
compiled World Bank statistics).
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pursuit of diversity as an affirmative value,42 which makes evaluating its experiment with diversity within
corporate governance potentially fruitful. In chapter 6, I use a mixed-methods content analysis to
investigate the US approach. I examine the microdynamics of how corporations have responded to the
SEC rule during the first four years. The rule does not define “diversity,” leaving it to corporations to give
this term meaning; firms accordingly have adopted different interpretations. Chapter 7 situates the
findings within the literature on social norms and the expressive function of law and offers
recommendations that might serve to strengthen the US approach.
Chapter 8 concludes by drawing out key lessons from the analysis conducted in the previous
chapters and then engaging two sets of questions. First, I consider how and to what extent the two
regulatory models I study should inform the future development of diversity initiatives in North
American corporate governance. I turn my attention to Canada, where reform is nascent as of this
writing. Second, I identify future lines of research and inquiry that my case studies suggest. I emphasize
that the underlying theoretical basis for inclusion must be further developed and augmented with
equity-based arguments. This work will necessitate continued efforts to connect diversification
initiatives to contemporary debates regarding corporate theory and to broaden the focus of most
jurisdictions to include underrepresented socio-demographic groups other than women. Finally, I
highlight that law offers but one mechanism for reform and that legal authority will act in concert with
other important extralegal and voluntary dynamics and programs. That said, law will be an integral part
of achieving diversity, and the legal regulations adopted to serve this end require sustained analysis.
Methodological approach
Langevoort notes that the fields of corporate governance and antidiscrimination barely speak
with one another.43 In attempting to forge such a dialogue, this book’s overall approach and research
design are decidedly socio-legal. Schmidt and Halliday observe that “[t]he complex arenas of corporate
law . . . remain ripe for exploration by Law and Society scholars,”44 while Berrey notes that
“[s]urprisingly few studies have examined empirically how legal ideas of diversity get put to use into
everyday organizational practices.”45 I am mindful of these observations: while I devote substantial time
to the black-letter text of quota and disclosure laws, I primarily focus on interrogating the social
meanings that these laws convey. I explore the legal regulation and discourse surrounding corporate
board diversity in action and in its institutional and socio-political contexts.46
I empirically investigate two jurisdictions’ regulatory experiments with boardroom
diversification, alert to the fact that “[t]he evidence from multiple cases is often considered more
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.”47 As such, while I do not
42
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attempt to provide a direct comparative analysis, I employ a multiple-case research design that
examines each of the primary approaches jurisdictions have taken to address boardroom homogeneity,
rather than focusing on one approach over the other.48
With respect to quotas, in order to understand this form of regulation, I open up the typically
closed doors of the boardroom. Fanto, Solan, and Darley note that most commentators must resort to
conjecture about boardroom dynamics, “since boards are an elite, closed environment accessible to few
persons (and few academics).”49 I therefore break into the “black box”50 of boardroom conduct and
practice. I delve into the personal experiences of Norwegian directors who gained appointments as a
result of Norway’s quota law, as well as those who held appointments before the law was enacted.
Several questions frame my investigation. How have these individuals subjectively experienced, and
made sense of, this intrusive form of regulation? How does legally required gender diversity affect their
economic and institutional lives? And how has it shaped boardroom cultural dynamics and decision
making, as well as the overall governance fabric of the board?
Scholars do not typically use qualitative inquiry in corporate law and corporate governance
research.51 The preference for an instrumental approach to analyzing corporate dynamics has rendered
corporate law a sort of “erasing discourse” that considers personal stories inside the corporate form
immaterial.52 And yet interview-based research, which draws from personal identity narratives, can
highlight important dynamics in the operation of the corporation. It is only through collecting primary
data on how the law has translated into the day-to-day existence of directors that we can begin to
answer the big-picture questions surrounding the viability of positive discrimination in corporate
governance. As Huse argues, “The missing ingredient in understanding and researching boards of
directors is the human side of governance.”53
Exploring these questions will also help us to understand the dynamics of identity politics within
corporate leadership. The sociologist Puwar explores the realities of marginalized groups who are
granted access to positions and spaces from which they have traditionally been excluded, referring to
these groups as “space invaders.” Focusing on the specific site of the UK Parliament, she writes:
[W]hat happens when those bodies not expected to occupy certain places do so[?] And
most specifically . . . what happens when women and racialised minorities take up
‘privileged’ positions which have not been ‘reserved’ for them, for which, they are not,
48
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in short, the somatic norm[?] What are the terms of coexistence? This is an encounter
that causes disruption, necessitates negotiation and invites complicity. Here we have
the paradox of the increasing proximity of the hitherto outside with the inside proper,
or, should I say, with the somatic norm. While they now exist on the inside, they still do
not have an undisputed right to occupy the space.54
Flowing from this, what has performing the role of “space invader” meant to the women who have
gained access to the boardroom—a space historically defined by men?55 How have these women
navigated these gendered corporate borders? Overall, what are the “master narratives,” or dominant
recurring perceptions, of those who have direct experience with the socio-legal phenomenon at issue?56
How is gender constructed, reconstructed, and ultimately performed in the boardroom?
With regard to disclosure, the data derived from the first four years of the SEC rule provide a
unique window into the potential meanings of “diversity” in the corporate setting, as well as the limits
of a strategy that permits corporations to give the term their own definition. Here, I shift my focus from
the lived experiences of directors to the text of corporate reports. I culled the relevant data from
corporate disclosure documents, which, to varying degrees, constitute “cultural products”57 that reveal a
firm’s behaviors, practices, and assumptions.58 They are written presentations of organizational
identity,59 or “that which is central, enduring, and distinctive about an organization.”60
Engle Merry writes that “law consists of a complex repertoire of meanings and categories
understood differently by people depending on their experience with and knowledge of the law.”61 In
mining these documents, I am interested in learning how firms, in responding to the diversity disclosure
rule, construct the concept of diversity through their public discourse. What does diversity, viewed
through the prism of legal regulation, mean to market participants? How do they interpret and
understand this socio-political idea in the absence of a regulatory definition? How is it constituted and
discursively performed, and what vocabularies of diversity have emerged? In other words, I am
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concerned with “[t]he ways people understand and use law[,] . . . their habitual patterns of talk and
action, and their commonsense understanding of the world.”62
The Norwegian quota law and the US reporting rule came into effect either through formal
legislation or regulation. Yet diversity measures, such as international disclosure provisions, are often
found in so-called soft law mechanisms, including corporate governance codes, guidelines, best practice
principles, and stock exchange listing rules. While these may not be rooted in “formal” law, they play an
integral role in influencing corporate action and represent “the changing face of legal regulation in
globally integrated marketplaces.”63 As such, in referring to “regulatory” or “legal” initiatives and
measures throughout this book, I take a legal pluralist approach and intend this to refer to both hard
and soft forms of economic governance. Such an approach appreciates that legal authority stems from a
range of different social locations.64 Indeed, the reality of contemporary regulatory governance is that
both forms exert normative influence on firm behavior and, in some cases, are in conversation with one
another.65
The findings
The corporate governance world is in the midst of an important transition. Countries such as
Norway have adopted bold, potentially transformative initiatives aimed at creating gender balance in
boardrooms. The United States, by contrast, has taken a less interventionist regulatory approach. But in
both places, diversity has become an important part of the policy conversation. In these early stages of
regulation, it remains difficult to predict the full consequences of either approach. While the
boardroom’s equilibrium has been unsettled, it still carries “the weight of the sedimented past.”66 The
constitutive borders of diversity-related regulatory governance are still being drawn as regulators
engage with fundamental questions that implicate both the market and social identity politics. Still,
much can be learned from this initial period of international regulatory experimentation.
A.

The quota approach

With its combination of mandated gender balance and severe sanctions for noncompliance in
the form of forced corporate dissolution, the Norwegian quota model represents the boldest assault on
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traditional market sovereignty. If we measure progress by the rapid increase in sheer numbers of
women on boards, Norway unquestionably leads all other jurisdictions.67
Norway’s achievement, however, does not stem solely from the mere presence of more women
in its boardrooms. Seen through the eyes of the participants in my study, the particular design of
Norway’s law appears to have drawn out the substantive benefits that may flow from diversity. The
dominant narrative my interviewees conveyed was that quota-induced gender diversity has positively
affected boardroom work and firm governance. Generally, respondents emphasized the range of
perspectives and experiences that women bring to the boardroom, as well as the value of women’s
independence and outsider status to the work of the board. They also stressed women’s greater
propensity to engage in more rigorous deliberations, risk assessment, and monitoring.
One might expect that feminist principles and thinking would form key motifs in the interviews.
Rosenblum considers the Norwegian quota law, and quotas more broadly, under the tent of what Halley
et al. term “governance feminism,”68 or “the installation of . . . feminist ideas in actual legal and
institutional sites of power.”69 Very few of my interviewees explicitly invoked feminism. But the quota
law does appear to have had broader social effects by redistributing power in Norwegian society. Many
respondents discussed how the quota compelled boards and nominating committees to extend their
searches for new directors beyond the usual, traditional spheres of comfort. Boards had no choice but
to look outside of their existing networks. This forced action was perceived to be necessary to combat
the structural inequalities resulting from in-group favoritism and network-based barriers to positions of
power.
The presence of a critical mass of women, as required by the quota law, appears to have
mattered to the achievement of diversity-related outcomes. With a critical mass, women need not
acclimate to male-dominated corporate governance environments;70 rather, their presence can
effectuate deeper cultural change. Importantly, in part because of their critical mass, female
respondents overall reported that they did not feel stigmatized or marginalized as quota beneficiaries
and that they felt comfortable on their boards. Though their stories are complex, the majority
characterized the quota as a positive mechanism that had democratized access to a previously
unavailable space. It seems that the legal imposition of gender balance may thus carry the potential to
address what Guinier and Torres refer to as “walking backwards up a cheese grater”—the concern that
breaking into spaces of traditional exclusion may result in the space invader having integral parts of her
identity shaved away.71
My results suggest that female directors, present in substantial numbers, may enhance the level
of cognitive diversity and constructive conflict in the boardroom. They are more apt to critically analyze,
67
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test, and challenge received wisdom. In doing so, they appear to have harnessed for their boards the
value of dissent, a key driver of effective governance.72 That said, the lived reality of the quota law also
gives rise to a number of interesting and difficult questions for future research and of particular
relevance to other countries contemplating the adoption of a quota regime. I identify two sets of issues
that merit further inquiry. First, are there potential costs to the quota model, and will the law continue
to produce the advantages that have arisen thus far? For example, do the benefits that directors claim
women have brought to the boardroom reflect gendered assumptions about women’s behavior? And
will some of the benefits of women’s outsider status diminish over time, as women gradually assimilate
onto boards and into the networks of male directors? Second, can the Norwegian experience be
translated to other national contexts, and what factors must be taken into account when attempting to
replicate it? How, for example, do particular features of different countries’ socio-political and corporate
governance cultures inform the viability of quota legislation?
B.

The disclosure approach

The SEC’s disclosure rule has caused US corporations to establish a vocabulary of diversity. My
study shows that “diversity” carries multiple connotations for these firms. My most salient finding,
however, is that when interpreting this concept in the absence of regulatory guidance, the dominant
corporate discourse is experiential rather than identity-based. Firms most frequently define diversity
with reference to a director’s prior experience or other nonidentity-based factors rather than his or her
socio-demographic characteristics.
How are we to receive this finding? What are its broader implications? For firms, directors who
bring a range of experiences to their positions will be attractive candidates who may possess relevant
knowledge and skills. Candidates with industry experience, for example, may be more likely to grasp
industry processes and patterns, have knowledge of the competition, be attuned to sources of strategic
advantage, and have a helpful network of contacts.73 Industry expertise has also been linked to
meaningful boosts in firm value.74 Further, certain studies that find a positive relationship between firm
value and board diversity broadly defined suggest that experiential diversity may result in more robust
positive financial outcomes as compared with socio-demographic diversity.75 Most significantly, unlike
identity-based characteristics, experience is a predictable, traditional variable that fits within most
standard conceptions of what it means to be qualified.
That said, for many observers of the SEC’s rule, including a number of large institutional
investors, whether the rule will stimulate consideration of socio-demographic representation, and
eventually increase levels of identity-based diversity on corporate boards, represents a significant
source of concern. In the future, when the rule has been in effect for a longer period of time, a
comprehensive study on the causal or correlative relationship between the rule and actual diversity
levels will be possible in order to evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure as a means of promoting socio72
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demographic diversity.76 In the meantime, my study’s preliminary finding—that, to date, other factors in
the disclosures overshadow social identity categories—serves as an initial caution that the SEC rule as
currently formulated may not produce diversity-enhancing results along socio-demographic lines. I
argue that the rule can be expected to produce meaningful socio-demographic results only if corporate
governance cultures internalize diversity as a social norm. Since that has not yet occurred, the results of
my content analysis can be expected to replicate themselves going forward in the absence of some sort
of change.
That said, I posit that the rule, if redesigned, would have greater potential than it does now to
alter existing norms and therefore to possibly modify behavior. Officially, the SEC disavows any desire to
affect firms’ conduct or to encourage any particular type of diversity. As I explain, however, I believe this
claim should be viewed with skepticism. I recommend revisiting the rule’s underlying architecture and
offer two recommendations that may improve its effectiveness: providing normative content for the
term “diversity,” and moving to a “comply-or-explain” disclosure design buttressed by targeted reviews
of issuers’ diversity filings.
Disclosure is attractive as a regulatory tool to the extent that it moves important issues into the
light and catalyzes a process of internal self-reflection on the part of the reporting party that can prompt
behavioral change. If well designed, a disclosure regime may yield important benefits. But its use may
also be called into question if it allows the regulated entity too much discretion in defining a core
feature of the regime.
Real world policy implications
I am cognizant of the dynamism of diversity-related corporate governance reform. At the time
of this writing, policymakers around the world are debating what, if any, regulatory paths to pursue to
facilitate boardroom heterogeneity.
Quotas and related target-based provisions for publicly traded firms are currently at different
stages of consideration in Canada,77 the EU,78 Germany,79 Scotland,80 South Africa,81 and the United Arab
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Emirates.82 The same is true for government-owned enterprises in Brazil83 and the Philippines.84 Other
states have signalled that they may resort to positive discrimination in the future, as a measure of last
resort. The UK government, for example, opposes quotas. After a 2013 report indicated that female
appointments to FTSE 100 boards had slowed, however, UK Business Secretary Vince Cable cautioned
firms that it may become increasingly difficult for the government to adhere to its voluntary plan and
that the shadow of quotas looms large over the market.85 Similarly, the Swedish minister of finance
recently expressed frustration with the slow pace of voluntary corporate action and stated that Sweden
may “gradually move towards being forced to launch quota legislation” in the near future if the situation
does not improve.86
New disclosure provisions are presently the subject of regulatory conversation in the European
Union and in Canada. In addition, some jurisdictions with reporting measures already in place are
currently reevaluating their efforts and contemplating reform. In 2012, Singapore updated its Code of
Corporate Governance to include a diversity disclosure provision.87 In 2013, a joint industry-government
Diversity Task Force took shape to study gender representation in the governance structures of
Singaporean companies and make recommendations to both the corporate sector and government.88
Similarly, the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority has recently put under the microscope that country’s
Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practices. While the Guidelines have contained a diversity element
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for quite some time,89 the regulator is considering stronger measures to combat the “lethargy in
appointing women to . . . boards.”90
As the debate continues and evolves, it is my hope that the original research I present here will
inform ongoing international policy discussions and deepen our understanding of the complexities
associated with corporate governance diversification. Though my analyses are suggestive, rather than
conclusive, they offer valuable insights into the role of law in reshaping the gendered fabric of corporate
governance cultures and thereby advance socio-legal discourse on the contemporary business
corporation. Of course, the experiences of my two case studies may not be easily transferred to other
jurisdictions. In contemplating regulatory design, no one-size-fits-all solution will be available to achieve
desired outcomes. Much depends on a complex web of interactions between a given jurisdiction’s sociopolitical culture, its corporate governance culture, and industry- and firm-particular characteristics. That
said, important points of commonality can be discovered, and valuable lessons can be learned, from
peering outside of sovereign borders.91 The case studies I present here provide insights that concretize
some of the most salient issues under debate around the world. In-depth consideration of these
experiences will help policymakers and scholars determine what regulatory measures can reasonably be
expected to accomplish and assess the factors that inform the success or failure of different approaches
to a crucial set of social and political debates.
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